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BY: ISLEY MARKMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent Supreme Court decisions about the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, Crawford v. Washington1 and Giles v. California,2 have affected how prosecutors pursue domestic violence cases by 
limiting their ability to use out-of-court statements made by the 
victim in lieu of direct testimony from the victim at trial. The 
unwillingness of victims to testify is typical of domestic vio-
lence cases, and as a result, courts have recognized the unique 
need to admit hearsay testimony in these cases. In Crawford, the 
Court articulated two exceptions to the Confrontation Clause: 
the non-testimonial exception and the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
exception.3 Since that decision, many lower courts have broadly 
construed the non-testimonial category to admit out-of-court 
statements in domestic violence cases. I argue that instead, both 
prosecutors and lower courts should focus on the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception to admit hearsay testimony in domestic 
violence cases in which the victim is unavailable to testify, ei-
ther because she is unwilling to cooperate with law enforce-
ment or because she was killed by the batterer. Dicta from the 
Supreme Court in Giles and cases from New York state courts 
provide guidance on how this exception should accommodate 
the realities of a domestic violence relationship. As applied in 
these cases, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, in compar-
ison to the non-testimonial exception, provides a more effective 
litigation strategy for prosecutors and is more protective of the 
rights of defendants.
In Part II, I discuss the expansion of hearsay exceptions to 
admit out-of-court statements by victims in domestic violence 
cases before the Crawford decision. In Part III, I summarize the 
Crawford decision and explain its effect on the admissibility 
of hearsay testimony in domestic violence cases. In Part IV, 
I examine lower court decisions admitting hearsay under the 
non-testimonial exception and argue that these decisions cut 
against the intent of Crawford. In Part V, using dicta from the 
Supreme Court in Giles and cases from New York as a guide, 
I explain how the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception can be 
adapted to admit hearsay in domestic violence cases in light of 
the unique nature of these personal relationships. Finally, in Part 
VI, I argue that for domestic violence cases, the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception is both a better strategy for prosecutors 
and more protective of defendants’ rights than the non-testimo-
nial exception.
II. BEFORE CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
Before 2004, the Supreme Court’ decision in Ohio v. Rob-
erts4 governed the admissibility of hearsay statements under the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.5 In Roberts, the Court 
decided that out-of-court statements are admissible notwith-
standing the Confrontation Clause if the declarant is unavailable 
and the statements bear adequate “indicia of reliability.”6 The 
Court explained, “[r]eliability can be inferred . . . in a case where 
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception [or 
where there are] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”7
Under Ohio v. Roberts, prosecutors relied on various hear-
say exceptions to admit out-of-court statements at trial. Under 
the “excited utterance” or “present sense impression” excep-
tions, codified in Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and (2) re-
spectively, courts admitted victims’ 911 calls and statements to 
responding officers, treating physicians, or friends and family 
made closely following the event of abuse while the victims 
were still under duress and when the statements pertained to that 
event.8 These hearsay exceptions apply regardless of the avail-
ability of the declarant. Prosecutors also relied on the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing hearsay exception, which is codified in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).9 This exception, which only applies 
when the declarant is unavailable, allows the admission of hear-
say when the defendant’s actions render the victim unavailable 
as a witness and the defendant had the specific intent to cause 
that result.10 This exception was most easily applied in cases in 
which a criminal investigation or prosecution for prior domes-
tic abuse was already pending, and the defendant subsequently 
threatened or actually harmed the victim to prevent her from 
testifying against him.
Other hearsay exceptions were expanded to accommodate 
the need for out-of-court evidence in domestic violence cases 
where victims were unavailable to testify. For example, in most 
cases, statements made by a victim to a doctor identifying a per-
petrator are not admissible through the “Medical Diagnosis or 
Treatment” hearsay exception;11 yet in domestic violence cases, 
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courts admitted these identifying statements as being reason-
ably pertinent to a medical diagnosis or treatment.12 In addi-
tion, some state legislatures enacted special hearsay exceptions 
for domestic violence cases. Enacted in 1996 in reaction to the 
O.J. Simpson trial, in which the court excluded all evidence of 
past domestic abuse by the defendant, § 1370 of the California 
Evidence Code allows the admission of hearsay statements in 
domestic violence cases where: (1) the statement was recorded, 
written, or made to a law enforcement officer or physician; (2) 
the statement was made soon after the threat of or actual physi-
cal abuse and described the incident; (3) the circumstances of 
the statement indicate its trustworthiness; and (4) the declarant 
is unavailable to testify.13
Accordingly, before Crawford, prosecutors were easily 
able to prosecute domestic violence cases by admitting hearsay 
testimony from the victim when she was unavailable to testify 
at trial, often through the expansion of exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay.
III. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Recent Supreme Court decisions have affected the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence in domestic violence cases. In Craw-
ford, the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court testimonial state-
ments made by a witness who does not appear at trial, unless 
that witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine her.14 Even testimonial state-
ments admissible under well-established hearsay exceptions 
cannot be admitted if the declarant has not been cross-examined 
by the defendant.15 Thus with regard to testimonial statements, 
Crawford overturned Roberts.16
After Crawford, hearsay statements offered against a de-
fendant in a criminal case potentially are admissible under the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause through two avenues. 
First, since Crawford applies only to testimonial statements, the 
admissibility of non-testimonial statements is still governed by 
the Roberts “indicia of reliability” test.17 Second, the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing doctrine, which provides an exception to both 
the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, allows 
prosecutors to introduce testimonial and non-testimonial out-of-
court statements.18 As the Court stated in Crawford, “the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes con-
frontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.”19 
Therefore, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrong-
doing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”20
Crawford was thought to have disastrous effects for domes-
tic violence prosecutions because victims are so often unwilling 
to testify.21 According to one report, within
days—even hours—of the Crawford decision, prose-
cutors were dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic 
violence cases that would have presented little diffi-
culty in the past. For example, during the summer of 
2004, half of the domestic violence cases set for trial 
in Dallas County, Texas, were dismissed because of 
evidentiary problems under Crawford.22
An anecdotal experience of mine highlights the issues raised by 
Crawford. While I was working as an intern in the Domestic Vi-
olence Unit of the King’s County District Attorney’s Office in 
Brooklyn, New York, an Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) 
there was prosecuting a case in which the defendant had alleg-
edly beaten and stabbed his wife and fired a gun in her presence 
upon suspecting that she was cheating on him. Although they 
had never legally separated, the defendant constantly moved 
in and out of their home. On a family vacation months prior 
to the incident at issue, the defendant physically assaulted his 
wife during a fight and local police forced him to leave their 
residence for the night. In her testimony to the grand jury, the 
victim asserted that the defendant, who had not been living with 
her at the time, showed up at her residence with a gun, beat 
her in the face, pushed a knife to her throat, fired a gun, and 
prevented her from seeking help or leaving the house for the 
entire night. A few days before trial, the victim, who was then 
residing in Florida, informed the ADA that she was unwilling 
to return to New York to testify at trial. Because grand jury 
testimony is objectively testimonial,23 unless the ADA could 
prove forfeiture-by-wrongdoing the victim’s grand jury testi-
mony was not admissible under Crawford. Without testimony 
from the victim or the grand jury testimony, the prosecution had 
no case to present at trial.
IV. DECISIONS AFTER CRAWFORD: 
NON-TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
While Crawford became an impediment to the admission 
of grand jury testimony and other clearly testimonial evidence 
(e.g., ex parte testimony from a preliminary hearing), it did not 
have the disastrous effect that many feared. In domestic vio-
lence cases decided since Crawford where the victim was un-
available to testify, courts have narrowly construed the meaning 
of “testimonial” to conform to already-expanded hearsay excep-
tions. Consequently, many types of hearsay are just as admis-
sible now as they were prior to Crawford.
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The Crawford decision failed to provide a clear definition 
of “testimonial.” However, two years later in Davis v. Wash-
ington (and a consolidated case, Hammon v. Indiana) the Court 
explained that whether statements are testimonial depends upon 
their primary purpose.24 Davis and Hammon, which parsed the 
potentially broad meaning of “testimonial,” were seen as a vic-
tory for domestic violence prosecutors. While the Court found 
that Hammon’s state-
ments to responding of-
ficers were testimonial 
and therefore inadmissi-
ble under Crawford, the 
Court determined that the 
911 call at issue in Davis 
was non-testimonial and 
could be admitted.25
Despite the guid-
ance provided by Davis 
and Hammon, the Court 
has yet to provide a clear 
test for testimonial state-
ments. In Crawford, the 
Court presented pos-
sible formulations of 
the standard including 
(a) whether the declar-
ant would expect her 
statements to be used in a prosecution, and (b) whether the 
statements were made under circumstances that would lead 
an objective witness to believe that they would be used later 
in trial. However, the Court declined to adopt either test.26 In 
Davis, the Court seemed to focus on the intent of questioning 
officers in obtaining the statements but again did not clearly 
articulate a universal standard.27 Instead, the Court provided a 
vague guide tied to the facts of the case:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive clas-
sification of all conceivable statements—or even all 
conceivable statements in response to police inter-
rogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, 
it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as fol-
lows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in 
the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.28
The Court in Davis attempted to create a dichotomy between 
a plea for help and providing information for an investigation. 
In reality, however, such a clean divide is often fictional29 and 
as case law shows, Davis failed to establish a bright-line dis-
tinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements. 
Rather, Davis opened the door to admitting any statements that 
could be contextualized as responding to an “ongoing emer-
gency.”30
In the absence of 
clear guidance, many 
courts in domestic vio-
lence cases following 
Davis have narrowly 
construed the defini-
tion of “testimonial” in 
order to admit hearsay 
from 911 calls, state-
ments to responding of-
ficers on the scene, and 
statements to non-police 
officers. First, courts 
have failed to parse and 
redact portions of 911 
calls as directed by the 
Davis Court. In Davis, 
the Court pointed to the 
facts of the case and ex-
plained that “a conversation which begins as an interrogation 
to determine the need for emergency assistance” can “evolve 
into testimonial statements.”31 If so, the Court instructed, lower 
courts may need to redact those portions of the 911 call that 
have “become testimonial.”32 While some courts have closely 
followed these instructions and parsed 911 calls,33 other courts 
have focused on the primary purpose of the call more generally 
and have found that responses to questions about the defen-
dant’s identity and history were non-testimonial and therefore 
admissible.34
Second, with regard to statements to responding officers, 
some cases have followed Hammon closely and found that a 
victim’s statements to responding officers on the scene and de-
scribing the incident are testimonial.35 However, other courts 
have treated the span of the ongoing emergency more liberally, 
holding that statements to responding officers were not testimo-
nial when the officers arrived at the scene promptly after the 911 
call or when the victim was visibly upset, even if the danger was 
over or paramedics were already treating the victim.36 One court 
even found statements made to officers at the police station to 
be “a plea for help in the face of a bona fide physical threat” 
and therefore non-testimonial.37 Another court found statements 
In the absence of clear guidance, 
many courts in domestic violence 
cases following Davis have 
narrowly construed the definition 
of “testimonial” in order to admit 
hearsay from 911 calls, statements to 
responding officers on the scene, and 
statements to non-police officers.
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made to law enforcement officers in a formal setting and absent 
any danger or emergency to be non-testimonial.38
Third, courts have admitted nearly all statements made to 
non-law enforcement officers. Even though “neither Crawford 
nor Davis limited testimonial statements to those obtained by 
law enforcement or their agents,”39 lower courts have univer-
sally held that “statements made to non-government questioners 
who are not acting in concert with or as agents of the govern-
ment are considered non-testimonial.”40 This approach is logical 
with regard to statements to friends and family since presum-
ably neither the victim nor the third party intended to make or 
elicit those statements for the purpose of a criminal prosecution. 
However, courts have found that statements made by a victim 
to doctors and counselors are non-testimonial, even when state 
law requires doctors to report the incident to the police.41 These 
cases stretch the limits of a common sense interpretation of “tes-
timonial” and may run counter to dicta in Davis, which treated 
911 operators as agents of the police.42
In Crawford, the Supreme Court determined that a defen-
dant’s Confrontation Clause right to test the evidence against 
him through cross-examination is not protected by judicial find-
ings of reliability under state hearsay laws.43 These lower court 
cases show that, at least in the context of domestic violence, this 
distinction has not effectively narrowed the types of statements 
that are admissible. While some types of hearsay statements are 
indisputably testimonial, courts read the vague Davis standard 
to admit a significant amount of hearsay evidence as non-testi-
monial and therefore as unaffected by Crawford.44 Because of 
this ability to bypass Crawford in many cases, in practice the 
decision has not had the crippling effect on domestic violence 
prosecutions that many anticipated.
V. DECISIONS AFTER CRAWFORD: 
FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING
In many domestic violence cases, the hearsay statements 
that prosecutors seek to admit are ex parte testimony from a 
preliminary or grand jury hearing. Because these statements fall 
squarely within the definition of “testimonial,”45 the government 
must rely upon the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception rather 
than the non-testimonial exception to admit the statements at 
trial. Although many argue that the criteria established in Giles 
is too restrictive, dicta from Giles and New York state cases 
demonstrate how courts can and should interpret the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing doctrine to admit hearsay evidence, particu-
larly in light of the realities of domestic abuse. These cases are 
instructive both for lethal cases like Giles, where the act for 
which the defendant is on trial (e.g., homicide) and the act that 
allegedly silenced the victim are the same, and for non-lethal 
cases where the defendant took separate actions before trial to 
discourage the victim from testifying.
A. GILES V. CALIFORNIA
In Giles, the Supreme Court clarified Crawford’s impli-
cations for the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and held 
that the doctrine can be applied only when “the defendant en-
gaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testi-
fying.”46 In that case, the defendant admitted to shooting the 
victim multiple times but claimed at trial that he had done so in 
self-defense.47 The prosecutors sought to introduce statements 
that the victim made to a police officer responding to a domes-
tic violence report three weeks before the shooting, in which 
she told the officer that the defendant physically assaulted and 
threatened to kill her.48 The trial court admitted these hearsay 
statements on the theory of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, but did 
not consider whether at the time of the murder the defendant had 
the specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying.49 The 
California Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant 
had committed an intentional criminal act that rendered the vic-
tim unavailable to testify.50 The United States Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded.51 The majority explained that in cases 
in which the defendant merely has the intent to cause a person to 
be absent but not the specific intent to prevent her from testify-
ing, the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing does not apply.52 
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would require the judge 
to usurp the jury’s role by deciding whether the defendant mur-
dered the victim.53
Three of the opinions in Giles discussed the implications of 
the Court’s decision for lethal domestic violence cases. Justice 
Breyer, writing for the dissent, noted the following:
Each year, domestic violence results in more than 
1,500 deaths and more than 2 million injuries; it ac-
counts for a substantial portion of all homicides; it 
typically involves a history of repeated violence; and 
it is difficult to prove in court because the victim is 
generally reluctant or unable to testify.54
Justice Breyer argued that only knowledge, and not purpose, 
should be required for the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine 
to apply because a knowledge requirement accords with the ra-
tionale of disincentivizing attempts by defendants to obstruct 
justice.55 In contrast, Justice Breyer noted, a purpose require-
ment places too high a burden on the prosecution56 and leads to 
absurd results.57
In response to Justice Breyer, the majority and concurring 
opinions asserted that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, as 
interpreted by the Court, would continue to admit the hearsay 
testimony of a victim in domestic violence cases if the prosecu-
tion could demonstrate a pattern of domestic violence and a his-
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tory of attempts by the defendant to control the victim.58 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, explained:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dis-
suade a victim from resorting to outside help, and 
include conduct designed to prevent testimony to po-
lice officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions. 
Where such an abusive relationship culminates in 
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the 
crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to 
stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or co-
operating with a criminal prosecution – rendering her 
prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doc-
trine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dis-
suade the victim from resorting to outside help would 
be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence 
of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim 
would have been expected to testify.59
Similarly, Justice Souter argued:
[T]he element of intention would normally be satisfied 
by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser 
in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to 
isolate the victim from outside help, including the aid 
of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the evi-
dence for admissibility shows a continuing relation-
ship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest 
that the oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned 
the dynamics of abuse the instant before he killed his 
victim, say in a fit of anger.60
A majority of justices, therefore, suggested that evidence of a 
history of domestic abuse by the defendant against the victim 
would be sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had the 
specific intent to silence the victim when he killed her, perhaps 
even absent a pending case at the time of the murder.61
While domestic violence groups had filed amicus curiae 
briefs arguing that a specific intent requirement “would cripple 
the truth-seeking purpose and integrity of adjudications and cre-
ate an incentive for batterers to kill their victims,”62 after the 
case was decided these same groups highlighted the portions 
of the majority and concurring opinions addressing domestic 
violence as “a victory for the domestic violence community.”63 
The Court’s dicta appropriately reflected both the unique nature 
of domestic violence relationships, in which one person acts to 
control the other, and the reality of domestic violence prosecu-
tions, in which the only evidence may be statements made by 
the victim to law enforcement about prior incidents of domes-
tic abuse that would be considered testimonial and subject to 
Crawford.
In doing so, the Court provided an avenue for prosecu-
tors and courts to use the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception 
to prosecute domestic violence cases effectively. With respect 
to lethal domestic violence cases, the Court explicitly invited 
prosecutors to present evidence of a history of domestic abuse 
to demonstrate that, by killing the victim, the defendant had 
the requisite specific intent to silence her. With respect to non-
lethal cases, the dicta from Giles should also influence courts to 
consider the realities of domestic violence relationships. Several 
cases from New York provide a model for this approach.
B. NEW YORK CASES
New York courts have relied upon expert evidence to de-
fine which types of acts, other than overt threats or violence, 
qualify as wrongdoing in the domestic violence context. For 
example, even before Crawford, a New York state court in 
People v. Santiago recognized “that in domestic violence cases 
repeated abuse followed by repeated withdrawal of prosecution 
and the repeated grant of forgiveness to the abuser make such 
cases very different from the norm.”64 In an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the defendant forfeited his Confrontation 
Clause rights, the prosecution presented the testimony of an ex-
pert in domestic violence and Battered Woman’s Syndrome.65 
The expert testified that “domestic violence is part of the effort 
by one partner to dominate and control the other” and that “[d]
omestic violence is characterized by the three phases of behav-
ior which are commonly referred to as the ‘cycle of violence.’ 
These are (1) the tension building phase, (2) the violent phase, 
and (3) the honeymoon phase.”66 The tension building and 
violent phases are self-explanatory; the honeymoon phase “is 
characterized by acts of contrition by the abuser, his requests 
for forgiveness and his declarations of love . . . [which] exploit 
the complainant’s fantasies of happiness and harmony and her 
hope that, notwithstanding previous abuse, a loving relation-
ship can and will continue.”67 A victim of domestic abuse may 
be unwilling to testify because she feels threatened or blames 
herself for the abuse. More significantly, a batterer’s promise of 
a better future and reconciliation, which often occurs between 
arrest and trial and is characteristic of the “honeymoon phase,” 
may discourage a victim from seeking assistance or testifying 
against him.68 In Santiago, the court found that the defendant 
had forfeited his right to confront the unavailable victim based 
upon the prosecution’s showing at the evidentiary hearing that 
the victim suffered from Battered Woman’s Syndrome, caused 
by the defendant, and that the defendant had made numerous 
“honeymoon” promises to the victim between his arrest and the 
trial.69 Accordingly, the court permitted the prosecution to intro-
duce the victim’s grand jury testimony.70
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A New York appellate court issued similar a decision fol-
lowing Crawford.71 In People v. Byrd, the trial court admitted 
the grand jury testimony of the victim after the prosecution 
demonstrated through an expert witness that the victim suffered 
from Battered Woman’s Syndrome.72 Similar to the Santiago 
court, the trial court in Byrd court reasoned that the defendant’s 
visits with, and hundreds of phone calls to, the victim while 
she was hospitalized after the incident of abuse were typical 
of the “honeymoon” phase of domestic violence and were in-
tended to procure her silence.73 The appellate court upheld the 
lower court’s reasoning, asserting that testimony about Battered 
Woman’s Syndrome and the victim’s history of domestic abuse 
“was relevant to place defendant’s actions in context to show 
that he had such a degree of control over [the victim] that seem-
ingly innocuous calls or hospital visits would have a coercive 
effect on her.”74
The Supreme Court’s decision in Giles did not limit nor 
implicitly overrule the decisions of the New York courts in 
Santiago and Byrd. Giles, a lethal domestic violence case, es-
tablished that absent other evidence 
courts could not assume that by 
murdering the victim, the defendant 
had the specific intent to prevent 
her from testifying as a witness.75 
Santiago and Byrd, on the other 
hand, involved non-lethal incidents 
of domestic violence in which the 
defendants took additional action 
after arrest and before trial to dis-
courage the victims from testify-
ing. Moreover, the New York Court 
of Appeals already had imposed a 
specific intent requirement for for-
feiture-by-wronging (like the U.S. 
Supreme Court did in Giles) before 
Santiago and Byrd were decided.76 
The Santiago and Byrd courts sim-
ply distinguished Maher.77 If anything, Giles encouraged the 
type of evidence and arguments accepted in the New York cases 
by inviting “prosecutors to make salient the full spectrum of 
abuse that resulted in a live victim’s absence from trial.”78
C. IN SUMMARY: LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL CASES
In light of the Court’s invitation in Giles, lower courts 
across the country should tailor the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
doctrine to the realities of domestic violence relationships. In 
lethal domestic violence cases, evidence of a history of domes-
tic violence should create the presumption that by killing the 
victim, the defendant had the specific intent to silence her. In 
non-lethal cases, this same history of violence alone may be 
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant intended to 
silence the victim even if that victim is still alive. Alternatively, 
lower courts should admit hearsay testimony pursuant to a find-
ing that, in light of the defendant’s history of domestic violence 
with the victim, the defendant intended to procure the victim’s 
silence through specific actions taken after the defendant’s ar-
rest that are characteristic of the “honeymoon” phase.
VI. A COMPARISON OF THE TWO CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE EXCEPTIONS: FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING 
AND NON-TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
As the Supreme Court in Giles and lower courts across the 
country have acknowledged, domestic violence crimes are no-
toriously hard to prosecute. Not only are these crimes signifi-
cantly underreported, but also victims often recant their earlier 
statements and refuse to testify at trial.79 When victims refuse to 
testify, typically the prosecution’s only potential evidence is out-
of-court statements. In recognition of these inherent problems 
in domestic violence cases, many 
courts have narrowly construed the 
category of testimonial statements 
vaguely defined in Crawford and 
Davis to admit hearsay evidence. 
Yet despite the Court’s apparent 
invitation in Giles, with the excep-
tion of a few cases from New York, 
lower courts have yet to use the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception 
to admit hearsay statements on the 
ground that the defendant’s history 
of domestic violence toward the 
victim or subsequent “honeymoon” 
acts effectively prevented the victim 
from testifying. It is unclear whether 
courts have rejected this argument 
or whether prosecutors have failed 
to advance it.80 Regardless, this approach should change; pros-
ecutors and courts should rely on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
doctrine because it is a more effective prosecution strategy and 
is more protective of defendants’ rights.
A. BENEFICIAL PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY
The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is a better pros-
ecution strategy than the non-testimonial exception. First, the 
doctrine applies to a broader spectrum of evidence than the non-
testimonial exception. When a defendant forfeits his Confron-
tation Clause rights with regard to the victim, all out-of-court 
statements made by the victim are potentially admissible. This 
means that all types of hearsay, including testimony from pre-
liminary and grand jury hearings, are admissible upon a singular 
In non-lethal cases, this 
same history of violence 
alone may be sufficient 
to support a finding that 
the defendant intended to 
silence the victim even if 
that victim is still alive.
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showing of forfeiture. In contrast, the non-testimonial excep-
tion can only be used to admit certain categories of hearsay and 
requires prosecutors to prove that each individual out-of-court 
statement is non-testimonial.
Second, the use of expert testimony to prove forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing in domestic violence cases may increase awareness 
of domestic violence issues over time. As experts have recog-
nized, Battered Woman’s Syndrome can both explain victims’ 
unwillingness to testify and their hesitation or recantation if and 
when they do testify. If lower courts across the country are will-
ing to hear testimony about the cycles of domestic violence and 
Battered Woman’s Syndrome in determining evidentiary issues, 
this may further public awareness about the prevalence and ef-
fects of domestic violence.81 In turn, increased public awareness 
may help jurors understand why some victims seem hesitant on 
the witness stand and why others refuse to testify altogether. 
Laws have the power to inform and change our social mores.82 
By educating the public about the nature of domestic violence, 
it is less likely that jurors will misinterpret a victim’s hesitance 
or absence as a lack of credibility.83
B. PROTECTIVE OF DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
An increased reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
doctrine rather than the non-testimonial exception will also be 
more protective of defendants’ rights. First, as discussed supra 
Part III, the Supreme Court in Crawford explicitly separated 
the Confrontation Clause inquiry from the reliability inquiry 
of state hearsay law.84 By broadly construing the meaning of 
“non-testimonial” under Davis to include categories of state-
ments admissible under hearsay exceptions, lower court deci-
sions have eroded this distinction and cut against defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment rights as outlined in Crawford.85 As the Court 
explained,
[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal proce-
dure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations 
as evidence against the accused . . . Leaving the regula-
tion of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence 
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to 
prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.86
Second, because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception is 
applied only in cases in which the defendant has taken affirma-
tive actions to deny the prosecution the ability to call one of its 
witnesses, reliance on this exception means that a defendant’s 
own actions will determine whether he receives constitutional 
protection. In contrast, the applicability of the non-testimonial 
exception depends on the conduct of the police and the alleged 
victim (e.g., whether the victim called 911 or how soon officers 
arrived at the crime scene). Affording a defendant control over 
his own constitutional right to confront witnesses against him 
is more just in the sense that it conforms constitutional rights 
to the moral content of the defendant’s actions. In addition, by 
conditioning the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights on the 
actions of others, the non-testimonial exception may create per-
verse incentives for law enforcement:
Rather than resolving emergencies before conducting 
an investigation, police officers might be inclined to 
gather as much information as possible during a pend-
ing emergency in order to evade the Confrontation 
Clause. 911 operators, for instance, might be instructed 
to press callers for information about their assailants 
during the emergency rather than guide them to safety 
and then ask questions.87
Third, reliance on the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine 
instead of the non-testimonial exception in domestic violence 
cases will also protect the rights of criminal defendants in other 
types of cases. In acknowledgement of the difficulty of pros-
ecuting domestic violence cases, courts have favored admitting 
hearsay testimony.88 However, a broadly construed non-testi-
monial exception in domestic violence cases not only opens the 
door to the admission of more hearsay in domestic violence 
cases, but it also leads to the admission of hearsay that would 
otherwise violate the Confrontation Clause in all other types of 
cases. For example, as discussed supra Part IV, courts dealing 
with the difficulties presented by domestic violence cases have 
taken a liberal view as to when a victim’s statements to respond-
ing officers should be considered non-testimonial. While these 
liberal classifications of non-testimonial hearsay theoretically 
may be confined to domestic violence cases, because the unique 
nature of domestic violence relationships was not part of the 
courts’ rationales in these decisions, it is more likely that these 
rules will be applied to other crimes (e.g., burglary). In con-
trast, expansive interpretations of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
doctrine in domestic violence cases would be based entirely on 
the realities and patterns of domestic violence. They would, 
therefore, be more likely to remain limited to domestic violence 
cases, in which the admission of hearsay is especially necessary.
C. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
Although there are likely many objections to the position I 
have taken in this paper, I will respond only to two particularly 
compelling objections. First, because the forfeiture-by-wrong-
doing doctrine is an equitable remedy rather than a rule based 
on the reliability of evidence, there is a danger that expanding 
the doctrine would allow the admission of a flood of unreliable 
hearsay in domestic violence trials. This danger is compounded 
by the fact that forfeiture-by-wrongdoing is also a hearsay ex-
ception, and therefore, most state hearsay laws will not filter 
out these out-of-court statements.89 However, the admissibil-
ity of all evidence is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
16 Spring 2011
(or corresponding state rules), which permits judges to exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect.90 Thus, even if a defendant has forfeited 
his Confrontation Clause rights, judges through Rule 403 may 
act as gatekeepers to prohibit the entry of unreliable evidence.
Second, some feminist scholars have criticized policies 
adopted by law enforcement that require mandatory arrest 
and prosecution in domestic violence cases.91 These scholars 
argue that mandatory intervention policies may increase future 
violence against the victim92 and, more importantly, strip do-
mestic violence victims of the ability to choose whether or not 
their case will be prosecuted.93 Wendy McElroy championed 
the Crawford decision as an equitable solution to this problem: 
“Domestic violence victims who wish to press charges can ben-
efit from increased sensitivity while those who decline to press 
charges can exercise control by refusing to cooperate with au-
thorities. The wishes of the victim may once again become le-
gally significant.”94 By admitting hearsay in domestic violence 
cases through the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, courts 
will allow prosecutors to pursue cases without the consent and 
participation of victims. Of course, this criticism applies equally 
to courts’ reliance on the non-testimonial exception.
VII. CONCLUSION
The unwillingness of domestic violence victims to testify 
at trial due to the psychological effects of domestic violence or 
specific actions by batterers is a notorious impediment to pros-
ecuting domestic violence cases. In addition, domestic violence 
cases, which often come down to the defendant’s word versus 
the victim’s, are nearly impossible to prosecute without hearsay 
testimony when the victim has been killed because there is no 
other way to present the victim’s side of the story.
Courts have historically looked for ways to stretch exist-
ing law to admit hearsay evidence in domestic violence cases. 
Before Crawford, when the admissibility of evidence under the 
Confrontation Clause depended on whether the statements at 
issue fell within an established hearsay exception or were oth-
erwise trustworthy, courts expanded many hearsay exceptions 
to admit out-of-court victim statements. After Crawford and 
Davis, in which the Court held that the admissibility of state-
ments under the Confrontation Clause depended on whether the 
statements were deemed testimonial, lower courts proceeded to 
stretch the meaning of “non-testimonial” to admit out-of-court 
statements in accordance with these already-expanded hearsay 
exceptions.
This has been a mistake. Instead of further expanding the 
non-testimonial exception, courts should adapt the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing doctrine to account for the realities of domestic 
abuse. In both lethal and non-lethal domestic violence cases, 
courts should accept evidence of a history of domestic abuse as 
probative of the defendant’s specific intent to prevent the victim 
from testifying. Additionally, in non-lethal cases, courts should 
follow decisions from New York and recognize that actions 
taken by the defendant after his arrest and leading up to trial 
that are typical of the “honeymoon” phase of domestic abuse 
may procure a victim’s silence in the same way as overt threats. 
If prosecutors assert these arguments and courts are willing to 
accept them, several beneficial effects will follow. First, use of 
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine will be more protective 
of defendants’ rights. Second, it will aid prosecutors by facili-
tating the admission of a broader spectrum of hearsay. Finally, 
it may have positive effects on society at large by increasing 
public awareness about Battered Woman’s Syndrome and the 
cycle of violence inherent in domestic violence relationships.
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